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1 Introdution
There has developed an interest in the theory and appliations of linking, also alled `interonne-
tion'. The basi idea is the following. Consider a group of deision makers who are simultaneously
involved in several dierent real world problems (issues). The standard approah is to onsider the
deision making proess for eah problem in isolation. In pratie, however, the deision making
proess with respet to one problem is usually inuened by the deision making proesses with
respet to the other problems (spill-over eets or links). Disarding the links among the issues
and analyzing the deision proess on eah issue separately rather than in a multi-issue deision
making ontext is likely to lead to biased outomes. Partiularly, a single issue approah ignores
the possibility that if the issues have ompensating asymmetries of similar magnitudes, an ex-
hange of onessions may allow and enhane ooperation whih extends beyond ooperation in
the single issue ontext. Some well-known real world examples of linking are the negotiations `on
land for peae' between Israel and Palestina and the deal on WTO membership and partiipation
in the Kyoto agreement between the EU and Russia.
In the eonomis literature the notion of linking has been applied in the ontext of multimarket
behavior in oligopolisti markets (see e.g. Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999) and of
international environmental problems (see e.g. Folmer et al., 1993; Botteon and Carraro, 1998;
Carraro and Sinisalo, 1999; Finus, 2001).
A game theoretial framework for the linking of repeated games was developed by Folmer et al.
(1993) and by Folmer and von Mouhe (1994). In Folmer and von Mouhe (2000) the following
themes for linking of repeated games were suggested: linking may sustain more ooperation,
1
may
eliminate soial welfare losses, may bring Pareto improvements and may failitate ooperation.
We observe that `may' is used here to indiate that the harateristis of linking of repeated
games mentioned do no hold unonditionally but depend on the partiular nature of the problem
at hand. However, to our best knowledge, the onditions under whih these harateristis hold
have not yet been thoroughly analyzed whih is a major omission in the light of the pratial and
theoretial relevane of linking. Admittedly, some results about the onditions under whih the
harateristis of more ooperation and Pareto improvements hold an be found in Ragland (1995)
and Just and Netanyahu (2000). However, these results are limited in sope beause the settings
in these publiations onern the speial ase of linking of two repeated 2× 2-bimatrix games.
The main purpose of this paper is to identify lasses of isolated stages games for whih the
themes 'linking may sustain more ooperation' and 'linking may bring Pareto improvements' mate-
rialize or not. For that purpose we formalize the themes 'linking may sustain more ooperation'and
'linking may bring Pareto improvements'. Our results apply to the linking of an arbitrary number
of repeated games with an arbitrary number of (the same) players. In setion 2 we present pre-
liminaries and introdue onepts. In setion 3 we present gures that illustrate these onepts
and that will be referred to in the next setions. In setion 4 we disuss 'more ooperation' and in
setion 5 Pareto improvements. Setion 6 onludes. Various proofs will be given in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Negotiation sets. Consider a game in strategi form among N players. That is, for eah player
i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N} we have a non-empty (ation) set X i and a real-valued (payo) funtion f i
on the set of multi-ations X := X1 × · · · × XN . In order to avoid some tehnialities we will
restrit ourselves here often to what we all regular games in strategi form, whih are games in
strategi form that satisfy the following three assumptions. First, eah payo funtion is bounded.
This assumption assures that the minimax payo vj of eah player j is a well-dened real number.
Seond, without any loss of generality, we assume that vj = 0 for eah player j. This assumption
implies that a payo vetor (i.e. an element of RN ) is individually rational if and only if it belongs
to RN+ , i.e. the losed positive otant of R
N
. Third, denoting f(x) := (f1(x), . . . , fN (x)), the
1
This is the ounterpart of the theme `repetition enables ooperation' for repeated games. 'More' is relative to
the single issue ase.
2
feasible set, i.e. the onvex hull co(U) of the set U := {f(x) | x ∈ X} of basi payo vetors, is
assumed to be losed. This ondition is always satised in the ase eah ation set is nite.
2
For a regular game in strategi form Γ, the intersetion of its set of individually rational payo
vetors and its feasible set is an important objet. We all it here simply the negotiation set of Γ
and denote it by H :3
H := o(U) ∩ RN+ .
The three assumptions presented above ensure that H is a ompat set.4
Beause eah Nash equilibrium payo vetor of Γ is individually rational, H ontains the set of
Nash equilibrium payo vetors. By PB(H) we denote the Pareto boundary of H and by PBw(H)
its weak Pareto boundary.
5
Beause H is ompat, PB(H) 6= ∅ if H is non-empty. Also we have
(see Appendix A.4)
PB(H) = PB(co(U)) ∩ RN+ . (1)
Given a game in strategi form Γ we all a maximizer x of the total payo funtion
∑N
j=1 f
j
a full-ooperative multi-ation. The set of suh multi-ations will be denoted by Y . It is easy to
see that (see Appendix A.4) for a regular game in strategi form we have
Y 6= ∅. (2)
Diret sum games and anonial mapping. Consider M games in strategi form 1Γ, . . . ,MΓ
among (the same) N players. We refer to them as isolated stage games and use pre-subsripts to
refer to objets related to them. Let M := {1, . . . ,M}, the set of issues. Let kXj be the ation
set of player j in kΓ. Dene for eah k ∈M
kX := kX
1 × · · · × kX
N
and for eah player j
∗X
j := 1X
j × · · · ×MX
j .
Moreover, dene the mapping Ψ : 1X× · · · ×MX → ∗X
1 × · · · × ∗X
N
by
Ψ(

 1
x
.
.
.
Mx

) := (∗x1, . . . , ∗xN ).
Ψ is alled the anonial mapping. Note that the anonial mapping is a bijetion.
For M games in strategi form 1Γ, . . . ,MΓ among N players, the trade-o diret sum game
(⊕Γ)α is dened as the game in strategi form where player j has ation set ∗X
j
and his payo
funtion is given by
6
f j(∗x
1, . . . , ∗x
N ) :=
M∑
k=1
kf
j(1x
1, . . . , 1x
N ).
(In the ase of two bimatrix games (⊕Γ)α is the tensor sum of the individual bimatrix games.)
The set of possible payos vetors Uα of (⊕Γ)α equals
∑
k∈M kU := 1U + · · ·MU .
7
2
Note that for a regular game in strategi form it is possible that its feasible set does not ontain 0. Indeed,
this for example holds for the regular bimatrix game
„
−2; 2 0; −4
1; −3 −2; 0
«
.
3
The negotiation set plays an important role in Folk theorems whih relate to the geometri struture of the set
of (average) subgame perfet Nash equilibrium payo vetors for repeated games < Γ > with Γ as stage game. In
this ontext it is ustomary to assume that repeated games are with disounting and that eah player has the same
disount fator δ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, if we onsider several repeated games below (with the same players) together,
then it is assumed that in eah of them the periods are the same and the disount fators are the same. For the
purpose of this paper it is not neessary to go into the details of (tehnially ompliated) Folk theorems. For this,
we refer to, for example, Benoît and Krishna (1996).
4
This set may be empty, as for example is the ase for the bimatrix game in footnote 2.
5
See appendix A.3 for Pareto boundaries.
6
The α refers to the fat that in this formula the payos of the isolated games are added (with weights 1).
7
For two subsets A,B of RN its Minkowski sum A+ B is dened by A+ B := {a+ b | a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
3
Let kE be the set of Nash equilibria of kΓ, kY the set of full-ooperative multi-ations of kΓ,
Eα the set of Nash equilibria of (⊕Γ)α and Yα the set of full-ooperative multi-ations of (⊕Γ)α.
It an be shown that (see Folmer et al., 1993; Folmer and von Mouhe, 1994)
Ψ(1E × · · · ×ME) = Eα, (3)
Ψ(1Y × · · · ×MY ) = Yα. (4)
Suppose eah kΓ is regular. Then (⊕Γ)α also is regular. The negotiation set of kΓ is
kH := R
N
+ ∩ co(kU).
Using the fat that a onvex hull of a sum is the sum of the onvex hulls, the negotiation set of
(⊕Γ)α is
Hα = R
N
+ ∩
∑
k∈M
co(kU).
Linking. Again, let 1Γ, . . . , kΓ be M regular games in strategi form and onsider the repeated
games < kΓ >. Linking of the (isolated) repeated games < kΓ > is done by ombining them into
a repeated game (⊗Γ)α, a so-alled trade-o tensor game. This trade-o tensor game has as stage
game the trade-o diret sum game (⊕Γ)α.
In order to analyse the eets of linking, we dene the aggregated negotiation set as
Hag :=
∑
k∈M
kH.
Hag may be onsidered as the negotiation set when the M repeated games are not linked but
merely aggregated. We remark that Hag = ∅ when some kH is empty. Beause∑
k∈M
(RN+ ∩ co(kU)) ⊆
∑
k∈M
RN+ ∩
∑
k∈M
co(kU) = R
N
+ ∩
∑
k∈M
co(kU) (5)
it follows that
Hag ⊆ Hα. (6)
We observe that equality holds in (6) if and only if the ⊆-symbol is a =-symbol in (5).
More ooperation and Pareto improvements. In Folmer et al. (1993) it is shown that Nash
equilibria for eah repeated game < kΓ > lead in a anonial way to a Nash equilibrium for the
trade-o tensor game (⊗Γ)α.
8
In general, the trade-o tensor game also has other (subgame
perfet) Nash equilibria. Folk theorems are useful in order to investigate the question how many
more subgame perfet Nash equilibria there are, partiularly by foussing on the set Hα \ Hag.
This leads to the following denition:
Denition 1 There is an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set if the strit inlusion Hag
⊂ Hα holds. ⋄
Hene, enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set an be interpreted as `Linking sustains more
ooperation'.
We all u ∈ PB(Hag) a (strong) expansion point of PB(Hag) if there exists w ∈ Hα suh that9
w ≫ u and a weak expansion point of PB(Hag) if there exists w ∈ Hα suh that w > u. By EXP
we denote the set of expansion points and by EXPw the set of weak expansion points. Of ourse,
EXP ⊆ EXPw and EXP ⊆ PB(Hag). Moreover, (see Appendix A.4)
EXP = PB(Hag) \ PBw(Hα). (7)
Below we shall only deal with strong expansion points.
8
It is straightforward to show that this statement remains valid if one replaes `Nash equilibrium' by `subgame
perfet Nash equilibrium'.
9
For a = (a1, . . . , aN ),b = (b1, . . . , bN ) ∈ RN we write a ≥ b if ai ≥ bi for all i. We write a > b if a ≥ b and
a 6= b. And we write a ≫ b if ai > bi for all i.
4
Denition 2 We speak of partial expansion (of the Pareto boundary of the aggregated negotia-
tion set) if ∅ ⊂ EXP ⊂ PB(Hag). In the ase EXP = ∅ we say that there is expansion nowhere.
Finally, in the ase ∅ ⊂ EXP = PB(Hag) there is expansion everywhere. ⋄
We observe that by virtue of Folk theorems the existene of an expansion point of PB(Hag)
is related to possible Pareto improvements. This may be interpreted as `Linking brings Pareto
improvements'.
Finally, we observe that if there is no enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set, i.e. if
Hag = Hα, then Hag andHα have the same Pareto boundaries and thus, by virtue of (7), EXP = ∅.
3 Figures
In this setion we present ve gures that illustrate the onepts dened above. Moreover, we wil
refer to these gures in setions 4 and 5. The gures present the linking of two repeated games,
where the isolated stage games are (regular) 2× 2- bimatrix games.
Figure 1 relates to the games
1Γ :=
(
2; 1 −3; 2
5; −1 0; 0
)
, 2Γ :=
(
1; 2 −1; 5
2; −3 0; 0
)
.
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
–4 –2 2 4 6
Figure 1: Expansion everywhere.
Figure 1, and also Figures 2  5, are to be interpreted as follows. Four polygons are drawn:
the feasible sets co(1U), co(2U), the sum of these two sets and the aggregated negotiation set
Hag = 1H+ 2H . Beause the minimax payo vetors for 1Γ and 2Γ are 0, the sets 1H and 2H an
be distinguished. Hag = 1H + 2H is the boldfaed polygon. Beause the minimax payo vetor
for (⊕Γ)α is 0, the set Hα an also be distinguished. For reasons of onveniene these four sets
for Figure 1 are drawn below.
–2
2
4
–2 2 4
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
–4 –2 2 4 6
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4
The sets in the above three gures respetively onern co(1U) and co(2U), co(1U) + co(2U)
and Hag = 1H + 2H .
5
We note that in the ase of Figure 1
(⊕Γ)α =


3; 3 1; 6 −2; 4 −4; 7
4;−2 2; 1 −1;−1 −3; 2
6; 1 4; 4 1; 2 −1; 5
7;−4 5;−1 2;−3 0; 0

 .
Figure 2 relates to the two games
1Γ :=
(
0; 2 3; 1
−3; 0 0; 0
)
, 2Γ :=
(
0; 1 1; 0.5
−2; 0 0; 0
)
.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
–4 –2 2 4
Figure 2: No enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set.
Figure 3 relates to the two games
1Γ :=
(
7; 1 −3; 3
10; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ :=
(
1; 7 −2; 10
3; −3 0; 0
)
.
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
–4 –2 2 4 6 8 10 12
Figure 3: Partial expansion (non-symmetri isolated stage games).
Figure 4 relates to the two games
1Γ :=
(
2; 2 −2; 4
4; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ :=
(
2; 2 −1; 1
1; −1 0; 0
)
Finally, Figure 5 relates to the two games
1Γ :=
(
2; 2 −2; 10
10; −2 0; 0
)
, 2Γ :=
(
3; 3 −3; 4
4; −3 0; 0
)
.
6
–2
2
4
6
–2 2 4 6
Figure 4: Enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set and expansion nowhere.
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
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10
12
14
–4 –2 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Figure 5: Partial expansion (symmetri isolated stage games).
4 Linking sustains more ooperation
The next theorem, proven in Appendix A.4, identies three ases where linking does not lead to
an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set.
Theorem 1 Eah of the following onditions is suient for that there is no enrihment of the
aggregated negotiation set.
1. For eah k the payo funtion of eah player in kΓ is a positive multiple kr of its payo
funtion in 1Γ; this result holds in partiular if all isolated stage games are idential.
2. In eah isolated stage game eah basi payo vetor is individually rational.
10
3. Hα = ∅. ⋄
Theorem 1 is a negative result and learly shows that the struture of the isolated stage game
matters to ahieve more ooperation. Figure 2 shows that there are situations of no enrihment
of the aggregated negotiation set that are not overed by Theorem 1. In all other gures there is
an enrihment.
Now we turn to the onditions under whih a positive general result holds, i.e. linking leads
to an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set. For that purpose we present Theorem 2 as
a rst general result. This theorem deals with isolated stage games that have `ompensating
asymmetries of exatly the same magnitude'. This notion is dened as follows. Given isolated
stage games 1Γ, . . . ,NΓ (so M = N) we say that they have `ompensating asymmetries of ex-
atly the same magnitude' if there are N permutations pi1, . . . , piN of N with pi1 := Id (i.e. the
idential permutation) suh that for eah j ∈ N one has {pi1(j), . . . , piN (j)} = N and suh that
kΓ := pik(1Γ) (k ∈M). So eah kΓ is a permutation of 1Γ (see Appendix A.1 for permuted games),
but not all N ! permuted games of 1Γ are allowed.
11
10
Note that this is equivalent with `in eah isolated stage game eah point of its feasible set is individually
rational'.
11
It should be noted that regularity of 1Γ implies regularity of eah kΓ and that if one of then is symmetri, all
are suh.
7
Another ondition in Theorem 2 is that Γ has a defet (Folmer and von Mouhe, 2000): a game
in strategi form with bounded payo funtions has a j-defet (where j ∈ N ) if for player j no
full-ooperative payo vetor is individually rational. The game has a defet if it has a j-defet for
some j. Of ourse, a defet exludes the possibility that a Nash equilibrium is full-ooperative.12
It also exludes the possibility that the game is symmetri and regular.
13
Theorem 2 Consider isolated regular stage games that have ompensating asymmetries of exatly
the same magnitude. If Γ := 1Γ has a Nash equilibrium and a defet, then there is an enrihment
of the aggregated negotiation set. Moreover, the game (⊕Γ)α has a Nash equilibrium for whih
there exists a full-ooperative unanimous Pareto improvement. ⋄
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A.4. Note that in Theorem 2 all the isolated
stage games have a defet, but (⊕Γ)α does not have. Theorem 2 explains the enrihment of the
aggregated negotiation set in Figure 1 (where Γ has a 2-defet). Figures 35 show that there are
situations of enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set that are not overed by Theorem 2. We
observe that Theorem 2 does not exlude the possibility that in the ase the isolated stage games
are symmetri (without having ompensating asymmetries of exatly the same magnitude), there
ould be an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set (Figures 4 and 5).
We note that in Figures 1, 3 and 5 the isolated stage games are prisoners' dilemma games,
14
but that this is not the ase for Figure 4. Conerning this aspet:
Corollary 1 Consider isolated regular stage games that are 2 × 2-bimatrix prisoners' dilemma
games, with a unique full-ooperative multi-ation that have ompensating asymmetries of exatly
the same magnitude, Then there is an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set. Moreover,
(⊕Γ)α has a Nash equilibrium for whih there exists a full-ooperative unanimous Pareto improve-
ment. ⋄
Indeed, for this situation 1Γ automatially has a Nash equilibrium and a j-defet for some j.
15
5 Linking brings Pareto improvements
We have already seen that if there is no enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set, then there is
expansion nowhere. A natural question now is whether enrihment of the aggregated negotiation
set implies that there is an expansion point. The answer is `no' as Figure 4 shows. Note that in
this gure the Pareto boundary PB(2H) is the singleton {(2, 2)}.
Theorem 1(2) implies that if in eah isolated stage game eah point of its feasible set is indi-
vidually rational, then there is expansion nowhere. Also in Figure 2 there is expansion nowhere,
but this an not be explained in this way. Individual rationality of eah point of the feasible sets
is a strong ondition. In Theorem 4 there is a weaker ondition that also guarantees expansion
nowhere and explains expansion nowhere in Figure 2. The proof of Theorem 4 uses the tehnique
of normal ones
16
and is a little bit ompliated. Therefore, before we turn to this theorem, we
state a speial ase of it, Theorem 3, for whih we an provide a simple proof.
12
In this sense one may say that a defet implies that eah Nash equilibrium has a welfare loss. For suh a game
the welfare loss remains when we repeat the game. See Folmer and von Mouhe (1994, Proposition 4.2.) for a
preise statement.
13
Here is a proof of this statement, by ontradition. Suppose Γ is symmetri, regular and has a j-defet. Then
for eah permutation pi of N the game pi(Γ) has a pi−1(j)-defet. But pi(Γ) = Γ, so Γ has an i-defet for eah
i ∈ N . By (2) there exists a full-ooperative multi-ation y. Let n be a Nash equilibrium. Then one has (using
the fat that eah Nash equilibrium payo vetor is individually rational)
PN
j=1 f
j(n) ≥
PN
j=1 0 >
PN
j=1 f
j(y), a
ontradition.
14
We all a game in strategi form a prisoners' dilemma game if eah player has a stritly dominant ation and
the stritly dominant equilibrium is not Pareto-eient in the weak sense.
15
The last statement is a diret onsequene of the fat that for every 2 × 2-bimatrix prisoners' dilemma game
the Nash equilibrium payo for eah player equals his minimax payo.
16
A more diret proof of Theorem 4 would be welome.
8
Theorem 3 If, in ase M = 2, for eah of the isolated stage games eah point of the Pareto
boundary of its feasible set is individually rational and at least one of these Pareto boundaries is
a singleton, then PB(Hα) = PB(Hag) and therefore there is expansion nowhere. ⋄
For the proof of this theorem see Appendix A.4. The onlusion of expansion nowhere in Theorem 3
even holds for general M without the singleton assumption:
Theorem 4 If for eah of the isolated stage games eah point of the Pareto boundary of its feasible
set is individually rational, then there is expansion nowhere. ⋄
Also for the proof of this theorem see Appendix A.4.
Figure 2 illustrates Theorem 4 and Figure 4 shows that there are situations of expansion
nowhere that are not overed by Theorem 4. Note that in Figure 2 there even is no enrihment of
the aggregated negotiation set (and that for player 2 the rst isolated stage game 'is half the seond
one'). An important issue for further researh is whether for the ases speied in Theorem 4 there
always is no enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set.
Figures 3 and 5 show ases where there is partial expansion. Note that in Figure 1 there
is expansion everywhere. Another interesting question for further researh is whether expansion
everywhere always holds in Theorem 2. An even more basi question is whether or not an expansion
point always exists in Theorem 2.
Finally we note that even in ase eah isolated stage game is symmetri, there may be partial
expansion as Figure 5 shows.
6 Conlusion
In this paper we have presented some general results on more ooperation and Pareto improvements
whih an be ahieved by linking of repeated games. We have dened `more ooperation' by the
notion of enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set and `Pareto improvement' by the notion of
expansion point of the Pareto boundary of the aggregated negotiation set. Using these notions we
have formalized for tensor games the theme `linking may sustain more ooperation' and `linking
may bring Pareto improvements'.
We have shown that in the ase linking brings Pareto improvements, it also sustains more
ooperation but that the reverse does not hold in general. We have identied a lass of isolated
stage games for whih linking does not sustain more ooperation and a lass for whih it does.
In order to identify this last lass we formalized the basi idea that an exhange of onessions
may enhane ooperation if the issues have ompensating asymmetries of similar magnitude. For
this lass all isolated stage games are asymmetri and permutations of eah other and all have the
property that eah full-ooperative payo vetor is not individually rational. Conerning Pareto
improvements, we derived (in the appendix) a haraterization of expansion points in terms of
positive normal ones and used this in order to identify a lass where linking does not bring
Pareto improvements. We showed that also in the ase all isolated stage game are symmetri (but
not idential), more ooperation and even partial expansion is possible.
The gures that we used for illustrating our results lead to interesting questions for further
researh:
A. How far an one deviate in Theorem 2 from the situation of (exat) permuted games? This
would model the notion of `similar magnitude' in the expression `an exhange of onessions
in issues that have ompensating asymmetries of similar magnitude'.
B. Derive (interesting) suient onditions (like the onjeture in C) for the existene of expansion
points.
C. If the isolated stage games have ompensating asymmetries of exatly the same magnitude and
one of them has a Nash equilibrium and a defet, is there then always expansion everywhere?
More basially, we onjeture that there then always is at least one expansion point.
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D. If for eah of the isolated stage games eah point of the Pareto boundary of its feasible set is
individually rational, is there then no enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set?
Finally, we observe that although this paper is about game theory, the problems we deal with are
in fat geometri problems related to Minkowski sums and intersetions of onvex sets. Therefore,
basi researh on linking should (also) relate to these topis.
A Appendies
Before turning to the proofs in Appendix A.4 we present some denitions and useful results. For
those for whih it is diult to trae them in the literature we also give a proof.
A.1 Permuted games
Given a Cartesian produt of sets A1 × . . .×AN , we dene for a permutation κ of {1, . . . , N} the
mapping Tκ : A1 × · · · ×AN → Aκ(1) × · · · ×Aκ(N) by Tκ(a1, . . . , aN ) := (aκ(1), . . . , aκ(N)).
Let Γ be a game in strategi form and pi a permutation of N . We dene the game in strategi
form pi(Γ) (alled a permuted game of Γ) as the game in strategi form where the ation set Zi of
player i is Xpi(i) and his payo funtion hi is fpi(i) ◦ Tpi−1. So,
hi(z1, . . . , zN) = fpi(i)(zpi
−1(1), . . . , zpi
−1(N)).
Finally, a game in strategi form Γ where eah player has the same ation set X is alled
symmetri if for eah permutation pi of N one has Γ = pi(Γ).
A.2 Normal ones
Let A be a non-empty subset of RN and x ∈ A, i.e. x is an element of the topologial losure of
A. Then
NA(x) := {d ∈ R
N | (y − x) · d ≤ 0 for all y ∈ A}.
NA(x) is a onvex one and is alled the normal one of A in x. Moreover, we dene for x ∈ A
the positive normal one of A in x as
N+A (x) := {d ∈ NA(x) | d > 0}.
Note that 0 ∈ NA(x), but that N
+
A (x) may be empty.
Let kA (1 ≤ k ≤M) be subsets of R
N
. It is straightforward to prove hat for ka ∈ kA (1 ≤ k ≤
M), with a :=
∑N
k=1 ka, one has
NPM
k=1 k
A(a) = ∩
M
k=1NkA(ka). (8)
A.3 Pareto boundaries
Dene the funtion C : RN → R by C(x) :=
∑N
l=1 x
l
. For a subset A of RN we dene A˜ as the set
of maximizers of the restrited funtion C ↾ A, i.e. of the funtion C : A → R. Moreover, dene
s(A) ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞} as the supremum of the funtion C ↾ A. Closedness (boundedness) of A
implies losedness (boundedness) of A˜ and if A is a non-empty ompat subset of RN , then A˜ is
non-empty and ompat as well.
It is also straightforward to prove the following properties for all subsets A,B of RN :
˜o(A) = o(A˜); (9)
s(o(A)) = s(A); (10)
s(A+B) = s(A) + s(B). (11)
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For a subset A of RN its (strong) Pareto boundary PB(A) is dened as the set of elements a of
A for whih there does not exist c ∈ A with c > a whereas its weak Pareto boundary PBw(A) is
dened as the set of elements a of A for whih there does not exist c ∈ A with c ≫ a. Of ourse,
PB(A) ⊆ PBw(A). For ∂A, the topologial boundary of A, we have
A˜ ⊆ PB(A) ⊆ PBw(A) ⊆ ∂A.
So PB(A) 6= ∅ if A is ompat and non-empty.
Let Ak (1 ≤ k ≤M) be subsets of R
N
. It is easy to show that for ak ∈ Ak (1 ≤ k ≤M), with
a :=
∑N
k=1 ak, one has
a ∈ PB(
M∑
k=1
Ak) ⇒ ak ∈ PB(Ak) for all k.
Thus in partiular
PB(
M∑
k=1
Ak) ⊆
M∑
k=1
PB(Ak). (12)
Lemma 1 Let A be a ompat subset A of RN . For eah a ∈ A there exists b ∈ PB(A) with
b ≥ a. ⋄
Proof. Z := {z ∈ RN | z ≥ x} is losed. This implies that Z∩A is ompat. Beause x ∈ Z ∩A,
Z ∩A 6= ∅ and therefore also PB(Z ∩A) 6= ∅. Take y ∈ PB(Z ∩A). Then y ∈ Z, so y ≥ x. Also
y ∈ PB(A), beause otherwise there would exist b ∈ A with b > y. Then we had b > y ≥ x, so
b ∈ Z ∩A and b > y, whih is a ontradition with y ∈ PB(Z ∩A). Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 now will be used to derive further properties.
Lemma 2 For two non-empty subsets A and B of RN with A ⊆ B and a ∈ A one has:
B ompat and PB(B) ⊆ A ⇒ N+B (a) = N
+
A (a). ⋄
Proof. Beause A ⊆ B one has N+B (a) ⊆ N
+
A (a). By ontradition we prove that N
+
B (a) ⊇
N+A (a). So suppose γ ∈ N
+
A (a) \N
+
B (a). Now (w− a) ·γ ≤ 0 for all w ∈ A, but not for all z ∈ B.
This implies that there is a w ∈ B \A suh that γ · (w− a) > 0. Beause B is ompat, there is,
by Lemma 1, b ∈ PB(B) suh that b ≥ w. Beause γ > 0, also γ · (b − a) > 0. So b 6∈ A. But
b ∈ PB(B) ⊆ A, whih is a ontradition. Q.E.D.
In general the inlusion in (12) is not an equality. Here is a speial ase where equality holds:
Lemma 3 [A,B ⊆ RN , B ompat and #PB(B) = 1] ⇒ PB(A+B) = PB(A) + PB(B). ⋄
Proof. Only ⊇` remains to be proved. This we do by ontradition. So suppose x ∈ PB(A) +
PB(B), but x 6∈ PB(A + B). Write PB(B) = {b}. Let a ∈ PB(A) suh that x = a + b.
Beause B is ompat, there is for eah y ∈ B an element of PB(B), i.e. b, suh that y ≤ b. So
b− y ≥ 0 (y ∈ B. Beause x ∈ A+B and x 6∈ PB(A +B), there is d ∈ A +B with d > x. Let
a′ ∈ A and b′ ∈ B suh that d = a′ + b′, Then a′ > a+ (b− b′) ≥ a, so a′ > a. But a ∈ PB(A),
a ontradition. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Let B,C ⊆ RN suh that for no c ∈ C there exists d ∈ Cc with d > c. Then
PB(B ∩ C) = PB(B) ∩ C. ⋄
Proof. ⊆: by ontradition. So suppose a ∈ PB(B ∩ C) and a 6∈ PB(B) ∩ C. Beause
a ∈ B ∩ C ⊆ C, it follows that a 6∈ PB(B). Now there is b ∈ B with b > a. Beause
a ∈ PB(B ∩ C), it follows that b 6∈ B ∩ C. Thus b ∈ Cc, a ∈ C and b > a, whih is a
ontradition.
⊇. Suppose d ∈ PB(B) ∩ C. One has d ∈ B ∩ C. If we would have a ∈ B ∩ C suh that
a > c, then, noting that a ∈ B and d ∈ B, we would have a ontradition. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 5 Let A be a non-empty onvex subset of RN . Then a ∈ PBw(A) ⇒ N
+
A (a) 6= ∅. ⋄
Proof. Dene B := {x ∈ RN | x ≥ a}. One has B◦ = {x ∈ RN | x ≫ a} and thus B◦ ∩ A = ∅.
B◦ and A are onvex, non-empty and disjoint. Using a separation theorem, there exists an ane
hyperplane that A and B◦ separates. Therefore there exists γ ∈ Rn\{0} suh that γ ·z ≤ γ ·b (z ∈
A, b ∈ B◦). Even now
γ · z ≤ γ · b (z ∈ A,b ∈ B). (13)
With b = a it follows that γ · z ≤ γ · a (z ∈ A). Now we prove by ontradition that γ > 0. So
(remembering that γ 6= 0) suppose γi < 0 for some i. For b ∈ B dened by bj := aj (j 6= i) and
bi := x aar x ≥ ai, we have
γ · b =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
γjaj + γix.
For x large enough this number is less than γ · a, whih is a ontradition with (13). Q.E.D.
A.4 Remaining proofs
Proof of (2). Beause the game is regular, co(U) is losed, and bounded. So it is ompat.17
Beause it is also non-empty, c˜o(U) also is non-empty and therefore, by (9), also U˜ 6= ∅. Beause
of the general identity
U˜ = f(Y ), (14)
also Y 6= ∅. Q.E.D.
Proof of (1). `⊆': by ontradition. So suppose u ∈ PB(H) and u 6∈ PB(o(U))∩RN+ . Beause
u ∈ RN+ , it follows that u 6∈ PB(o(U)), Noting that u ∈ o(U), there exists w ∈ o(U) with
w > u. Therefore w ∈ RN+ and thus w ∈ H , whih is a ontradition with w ∈ PB(H).
`⊇': suppose u ∈ PB(o(U)) ∩ RN+ . Then u ∈ H and there does not exist w ∈ o(U) with
w > u. Thus there also dos not exist w ∈ H with w > u. Q.E.D.
Proof of (7). `⊆': suppose u ∈ EXP. Then u ∈ PB(Hag) and there exists w ∈ Hα suh that
w ≫ u. By (6), u ∈ Hα. Therefore w 6∈ PBw(Hα).
`⊇': suppose u ∈ PB(Hag) \ PBw(Hα). By (6), u ∈ Hα. Beause u 6∈ PBw(Hα), there is an
w ∈ Hα with w ≫ u. Thus u ∈ EXP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1. 1. We hek that equality in (5) holds. For r :=
∑
k kr one has (with
sums on k ∈M)∑
(RN+ ∩ co(kU)) =
∑
(RN+ ∩ kr co(1U)) =
∑
(krR
N
+ ∩ kr co(1U)) =
∑
kr(R
N
+ ∩ co(1U)) =
r(RN+ ∩ co(1U)) = rR
N
+ ∩ rco(1U)) = R
N
+ ∩ rco(1U) = R
N
+ ∩
∑
(kr co(1U)) = R
N
+ ∩
∑
co(kU).
We observe that the fourth equality holds beause RN+ ∩ co(1U) is onvex and the seventh holds
beause co(1U) is onvex.
2. Using kU ⊆ R
N
+ and
∑
k co(kU) ⊆ R
N
+ we obtain
∑
k(R
N
+ ∩ co(kU)) =
∑
k co(kU) =
co(
∑
k kU) = R
N
+ ∩ co(
∑
k kU) = R
N
+ ∩
∑
k co(kU).
3. Beause of (6). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. First a lemma:
Lemma 6 Suppose the following two onditions hold:
17
Note that U need not be ompat.
12
A. There exists an l suh that no element of the onvex hull of the full-ooperative payo vetors
of lΓ is individually rational,
B. The trade-o diret sum game (⊕Γ)α has an individually rational full-ooperative payo vetor.
Let b be suh a payo vetor.
Then b ∈ Hα \Hag and thus there is an enrihment of the aggregated negotiation set. ⋄
Proof. Condition A omes down to co(l˜U) ∩ R
N
+ = ∅ and Condition B to b ∈ U˜α ∩ R
N
+ . Using
(11) and the s-notation of Appendix A.3, we obtain
s(Uα) =
∑
k
s(kU).
Of ourse, b ∈ Hα.
Next we prove by ontradition that b 6∈
∑
k kH . Suppose that b =
∑
k kh with the kh ∈ kH .
Using (10) we have for eah k ∈M∑
j
kh
j ≤ s(co(kU)) = s(kU). (15)
Beause lh ∈ R
N
+ it follows that lh 6∈ o(l˜U) and so lh ∈ o(lU) \ o(l˜U). By virtue of (9) we have
co(l˜U) = c˜o(lU) and so lh ∈ o(lU) \ ˜o(lU). Therefore, in (15) we have a strit inequality for
k = l. Beause b ∈ U˜α, one has
∑
j b
j = s(Uα). It follows that s(Uα) =
∑
k s(kU) >
∑
k
∑
j kh
j =∑
j
∑
k kh
j =
∑
j b
j = s(Uα), whih is a ontradition. Q.E.D.
Now we will prove Theorem 2. We start by observing that if a regular game in strategi
form has a j-defet, then no element of the onvex hull of the full-ooperative payo vetors is
individually rational. Indeed, let Ij be the set of individually rational payo vetors for player j.
Having a j-defet means that U˜ ∩Ij = ∅. Note that this is equivalent to co(U˜)∩Ij = ∅.18 Finally,
using (14) it follows that co(f(Y )) ∩RN+ = ∅.
Beause of the above observation and 1Γ = Γ, ondition A of Lemma 6 holds for l = 1.
The proof is omplete if we show that (⊕Γ)α has a full-ooperative multi-ation Y and a Nash
equilibrium N suh that Y is a Pareto improvement of N. Indeed, denoting the payo funtions
of (⊕Γ)α with g
1, . . . , gN , g(N) is individually rational and therefore g(Y) too. Let n be a Nash
equilibrium of 1Γ. By virtue of (2), 1Γ has a full-ooperative multi-ation y. Beause kΓ = pik(Γ),
Tpik(n) is a Nash equilibrium of kΓ and Tpik(y) is a full-ooperative multi-ation of kΓ. Let
N := Ψ(


Tpi1(n)
.
.
.
TpiN (n)

 ), Y := Ψ(


Tpi1(y)
.
.
.
TpiN (y)

 ).
By (3) and (4) we have that N is a Nash equilibrium of (⊕Γ)α and Y is a full-ooperative multi-
ation of (⊕Γ)α. Beause 1Γ has a j-defet, n is not full-ooperative; (4) implies that N is not
full-ooperative either. The payos in N are
gi(N) =
N∑
k=1
(fpik(i) ◦ Tpi−1
k
)(Tpik(n) =
N∑
k=1
fpik(i)(n) =
N∑
l=1
f l(n).
So eah player has the same payo, say a, in N. In the same way one shows that eah player has
the same payo, say b, in Y. The total payo in N is Na and that in Y is Nb. Beause N is not
full-ooperative it follows that Na < Nb, i.e. a < b whih implies that Y is a unanimous Pareto
improvement of N. Q.E.D.
18
Here we use that for two subsets A and B of RN with Bc onvex: A ∩B = ∅ ⇔ o(A) ∩B = ∅.
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Proof of Theorem 3. We may assume that #PB(co(2U)) = 1. Next note that by (1)
PB(co(kU)) = PB(kH) (k = 1, 2).
So also #PB(2H) = 1. And beause, using (1 and (12), PB(co(Uα)) = PB(co(1U) + co(2U)) ⊆
PB(co(1U)) + PB(co(2U)) ⊆ R
N
+ , also
PB(co(Uα)) = PB(Hα).
Now we obtain, noting that feasible sets and negotiation sets are ompat, using Lemma 3,
PB(Hα) = PB(co(Uα)) = PB(co(1U) + co(2U)) =
PB(co(1U)) + PB(co(2U)) = PB(1H) + PB(2H) = PB(1H + 2H) = PB(Hag). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4. First a lemma:
Lemma 7 Suppose a ∈ PB(Hag). Then
a ∈ EXP ⇔ N+co(Uα)(a) = ∅. ⋄
Proof. ⇒. Let c ∈ PB(Hα) suh that c ≫ a. For all γ > 0 one has γ · (c − a) > 0. Beause
c ∈ co(Uα), it follows that γ 6∈ N
+
co(Uα)
(a).
⇐. By Lemma 5 one has a 6∈ PBw(co(Uα)). Let c ∈ co(Uα) with c ≫ a. Sine a ∈ R
N
+ , also
c ∈ RN+ . This implies c ∈ Hα. Thus a ∈ EXP. Q.E.D.
Now we prove Theorem 4. Aording to Lemma 7 the proof is omplete if we an prove that
N+co(Uα)(a) 6= ∅ for all a ∈ PB(Hag).
So suppose a ∈ PB(Hag) = PB(
∑
k kH). By Lemma 5 one has N
+P
k k
H
(a) 6= ∅. Beause
a ∈
∑
k kH , there exists ka ∈ kH(k ∈M) suh that a =
∑
k ka. With (8) one obtains
∩kN
+
kH
(a) 6= ∅.
By assumption PB(co(kU)) ⊆ R
N
+ for all k. Therefore PB(co(kU)) ⊆ R
N
+ ∩ co(kU) = kH . So we
an apply Lemma 2 with A = kH and B = co(kU) and get
N+co(kU)(ka) = N
+
kH
(ka) (k ∈ M)
and therefore
∩kN
+
co(kU)
(a) 6= ∅.
Applying again (8) one obtains N+co(Uα)(a) 6= ∅. Q.E.D.
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